

25 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support, NFAC

FROM :
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for
Conventional Forces

SUBJECT : A/NIO/CF Comment on Draft Paper, "DCI Role in
Warning & Crisis Management"

Specific Comments

1. Page 5, para 9, last sentence. The sentence does not square well with the concepts expressed in para 11 about issuing strategic warning. In para 11 we imply that strategic warning should be issued by the DCI, based (by implication) on our analysis of developments in an ongoing situation. The issuance of such strategic warning, then, is likely to be based not on "collection" per se, but on intelligence analysis.

Thus, the sentence in para 9 might better read: "Moreover, ... collection systems on which intelligence relies to monitor the development of potential major crises."

2. Sections ID and IE (paras 15 thru 22) are particularly to the point, e.g., the DCI's need for a powerful base totally responsive to his needs (CIA).

3. Pages 16-20, paras 30-36. This is also on the mark. Having just been involved in the Korea warning problem--and at the same time in the research aspects of the situation--I could not agree more with everything said here. However, it may be necessary to add a paragraph, perhaps 33a, pointing out for emphasis that I&W is a separate discipline. Moreover, in relying on the line organizations for this function, those organizations must be repeatedly sensitized to their I&W responsibilities--particularly the research analysts, whose depth of knowledge will probably allow them to recognize "indications" earlier than, say, current analysts. Finally, it should be pointed out here that some provision must be made for working group types of entities to research such I&W problems as WISP, WINK, development of indicators, etc., in spite of costs.

4. Pages 22-24, paras 40-42. No problem. This is also a good place to point out, if not elaborate on, the need for CIA to tie in more routinely to the DIA/DoD mechanisms for dialogue with the J-2s in the field. At the analytical and NIO levels, we should, along with DIA and NSA, initiate and respond to ANEXs and other informal exchanges with the field.



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6. Page 26, paras 45-50. I do not believe SWS is the central node. In fact, I do not believe it really serves the function for which it apparently was created. In fact, if it were disestablished, my own feeling is that no one would really care--no one at the analytical/substantive level.

7. Pages 30-31, paras 53-55. It would be worth noting here that Task Force products should be subject to review by the "highly qualified officers" whose job it is to provide the best analysis and reporting we can--which could be of greatest concern in a crisis.

****8.** Page 36, para 65. I do not agree with the concept expressed here that somehow the NIO, NITO, and "DDO officer" somehow form a consortium of equals. The NIO is the senior officer. It is to him that the NITO must look for guidance and an authoritative source for justifying particular tasking priorities. DDO, like the rest of the Community, is to report to and support the NIO.

9. DCI Arrangements for Collecting Tasking in Warning and in Crisis. This whole subject of the NITOs requires some clarification. Specifically, why a NITO for I&W/CM? The area NITOs are going to be the experts in the areas concerned, and whoever is their immediate superior should have some grasp of how collection in one area affects collection in the others. He is the logical senior NITO, to be involved for I&W/CM-types of situations.

10. IV, B. Warning. It should be stated here that the NIOs will be responsible to report to the Senior Assistant results of their Community reviews of potential problem areas, and, on an ad hoc basis, anything being done that bears on warning (W or w). This would in no way keep them from reporting the same through NFAC channels.

11. IV, C. Strategic Warning. Disagree with 1, 2, 4 and 5.

General Comments

12. There is a need to address the rest of the Community at greater length in this paper. Up to a point, we can sidestep involved issues by beefing up para 77 to be more specific about issues that must be resolved. However, this DCI's concern for Community involvement--and his control over the Community--I believe demand that we address more thoroughly how our proposed structures and changes would take on a Community flavor.

13. It is imperative that more CT input show up in the paper before decisions can be made on the final form of our recommendations. The relationships of CT and NFA are vague, as are CT responsibilities and roles.

14. It is clear that the Senior Assistant must be specifically empowered to task the Community, and require all elements of the Community to keep him informed of I&W-related issues. Specifically, he must be the one informed of 'maverick' views not given play through the NIO channels.

15. Moreover, he must be given some element of D/NFAC authority over the NIOs. That is, for I&W matters (and probably in CM as well) he should be the direct authority to whom the NIOs report.

